Diagnosing a Need for Organizational Change Case Study

Diagnosing a Need for Organizational Change - Case Study Example In this regard, the disaster that befell the shuttle Challenger provided a strong focal point from which organization within bodies could be viewed. The Challenger broke into pieces moments after takeoff on January 28 1986. Prior to this culmination of events, there had been revealing signs that were overlooked by the bodies in authority. A commission was formed to look into the matter and it filed its report after carrying out its research. In light of the above, NASA made most of the recommended changes brought forth by the commission that was looking into the Challenger disaster. Despite this, the occurrence of the Columbia accident on February 1, 2003 opened a new chapter into the effectiveness of the recommendations, and most importantly, shed some light on the issue of organizational culture that tends to undermine the effectiveness of organizations. Organizational culture is the aspect or custom of workers of an organization tending to carry out their activities in a way that may not be fully recommended, but in their organization, it is the norm (Carnall, 2007). While trying to counter this, models have been set up to ensure the best productivity of organizations. Such is the Burke-Litwin model for organizational change. It aims at bringing change to an organization through the creation of connections between performance and the factors within or without the organization, which has an effect over the performance (Burke, 2010). The model relies upon a framework through which the analysis of both internal or organizational factors and external or environmental factors can be linked together to ensure superb performance of an organization. It links both theoretical aspects and practical ideas to result in the best performance (Burke, 2010). This is done in twelve dimensions each of which caters for a particular aspect of the organization. Therefore, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report and recommendations as put under the Burke-Litwin model wou ld give a better view as follows: 1. External Environment. Following the Columbia disaster, CAIB realized that a number of external factors also indirectly resulted in the catastrophe. Such included such aspects as performance pressures from the public that tended to rush the organization into action hastily. Moreover, the budgetary allocations for the agency proved to be insufficient following shifting national priorities. 2. Mission and Strategy. Furthermore, CAIB analyzed NASA’s mission, and in comparison to the strategy employed to achieve that mission, the two were found not to tally. Moreover, the employees’ perspective was not in tandem with that of the top management (James, 2007). 3. Leadership. CAIB’s report found the leadership of NASA solely to blame for the disaster. It stated that the leadership lacked open-mindedness and could have acted quickly upon realizing that the space ship was damaged. However, this was not done hence exposing the laxity of leadership at NASA (James, 2007). 4. Organizational Culture. The report found out that NASA had come to adopt a culture through which matters were casually schemed through thereby leading to loopholes that provided avenues for such disasters. The foam responsible for the disaster had